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Past research on information systems development outsourcing (ISD-outsourcing) has found control 
theory to be a useful perspective for examining the co-ordination between the client and the vendor. 
Research on ISD-outsourcing has uncovered two distinct control mechanisms: structural and process 
control mechanisms. The structural control mechanism describes “what”, that is, the structure of the 
control mode, whereas the process control mechanism explains “how”, that is the process through which 
the control mode is enacted. Although the control literature discusses structural and process control 
mechanisms, it does not describe the ways in which control mechanisms can be combined for ensuring 
project success. Grounded in case study data from fifteen interviews in eight ISD-outsourcing projects, 
we conceptualise five control configurations describing the different combinative patterns of control 
mechanisms within and across control modes. Then, we identify the relationship between control 
configuration types and ISD-outsourcing project success. 
Keywords ISD, Outsourcing, Control, Project Success   
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1 INTRODUCTION 
There has been a substantial interest in Information System Development outsourcing (ISD-
outsourcing) in both academia and practice (Gregory et al. 2013; Srivastava and Teo 2012b; Summation 
Technologies 2013). ISD-outsourcing continues to remain the most popular type of IT outsourcing, with 
strong and continuous growth in such initiatives (Remus and Wiener 2012; Willmott 2012). However, 
more often than not, several outsourced ISD projects have failed to deliver the projected paybacks, 
primarily due to the lack of coordination amongst the comprising entities (clients and vendors) and their 
partially congruent objectives (Nakatsu and Iacovou 2009; Sedera et al. 2014; Tiwana and Keil 2009). 
Most firms outsourcing their ISD, attempt to minimize such performance impediments by 
experimenting with coordination and control mechanisms between the client and the vendor 
(Choudhury and Sabherwal 2003; McBride 2008).  
Control theory (Kirsch 1996; Ouchi 1979) is one of the theories that has been widely used to explain the 
regulatory mechanisms governing the relationship between the client and the vendor in the ISD-
outsourcing context (Narayanaswamy and Henry 2005; Nuwangi 2016; Srivastava and Teo 2012b; 
Tiwana 2010).  Such a control involves a controller (an individual or group of individuals representing 
the client organization) who monitors and evaluates the performance of a controllee (an individual or 
group of individuals representing the vendor organization) (Kirsch 1996; Narayanaswamy and Henry 
2005). Prior control literature discusses factors such as outcome measurability (Kirsch 1996; Kirsch 
1997), behavior measurability (Kirsch 1997), and the choice of control mode (such as outcome, behavior, 
clan, and self-control modes) in ascertaining project performance (Kirsch 1996; Srivastava and Teo 
2012b; Tiwana 2009). Despite the wealth of studies, Choudhury et al. (2003) and McBride (2008) 
highlighted that companies in general, lack a thorough understanding of appropriate control 
mechanisms for complex outsourcing projects.  
Extending the Control Theory, Srivastava and Teo (2012b) introduced the structural and process control 
mechanisms. The structural control mechanism is about “what” operates the control mode or the 
structure of the control mode (e.g. what outcomes and behaviors), whereas the process control 
mechanism explains “how” it is controlled, or the process through which the control mode is enacted 
(e.g. the processes used to attain the desired outcomes and behaviors)1. In general, past research identify 
that ISD-outsourcing projects fail to deliver their intended benefits, primarily due to inappropriate 
control mechanisms (Nakatsu and Iacovou 2009; Tiwana and Keil 2009). Rather than operationalizing 
a single process control mechanism, contemporary ISD-outsourcing projects use multiple process 
control mechanisms simultaneously. Although the control literature discusses process control 
mechanisms, it does not describe the configurations in which different process mechanisms can 
combine. These combinative configurations of process control mechanisms in a client-vendor 
relationship can be described as control configurations. We argue that in order to better leverage the 
control perspective, control configurations should be monitored so as to govern the client-vendor 
coordination efficiently, resulting in better project outcomes (Gopal and Gosain 2010; Srivastava and 
Teo 2012a; Srivastava and Teo 2012b). Monitoring control configurations provides an early clue to the 
condition of projects that can help companies minimize ISD-outsourcing project failures. In general, 
companies are not able to observe the control configurations until the project “goes live”2. In most cases, 
such observations are too late to solve problems and can only be a learning for future work. A proactive 
approach where the ISD-outsourcing partners implement the appropriate control configuration will 
enhance the likelihood of project success.  
Thus, the primary objectives of this paper are to 1) identify the control configurations through which 
different process control mechanisms manifest in client-vendor relationships, and 2) to identify the 
relationship between control configurations and ISD-outsourcing project success. This research enables 
us to better understand the nature of controlling in contemporary ISD-outsourcing and provide 
insightful findings to researchers and practitioners alike to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of 
the outsourcing process.  
                                                        
1 ISD-outsourcing projects function under the broad framework of a formally agreed upon contract that describes the structure of 
the project (expected outcomes or behaviors). ISD-outsourcing partners can decide the process control mechanism, which they 
use to achieve the expected outcomes and behaviors. For example, they may decide to follow the contract very closely or they 
may rely more on the ongoing relationship and mutual trust to decide about emergent operational situations. 
2 Go-live is when the information system is implemented after the completion of information system development. 
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2 CONTROL THEORY 
The review of literature presented here evaluates prior work in order to provide the background of the 
key concepts, provides a summary of the current understanding of control theory in relation to the ISD-
outsourcing projects, and identifies gaps that shape the focus of this research.  
Control Theory (Kirsch 1996; Ouchi 1979) is widely used in the ISD-outsourcing domain to explain 
controlling mechanisms between outsourcing partners (Choudhury and Sabherwal 2003; Nuwangi et 
al. 2018; Nuwangi et al. 2013; Tiwana 2010). According to Choudhury et al. (2003), prior studies on 
control theory have mainly focused on; 1) examining a specific control mode (e.g. outcome, behavior and 
clan control) (Henderson and Lee 1992; Kirsch 1996) or 2) exploring the factors (e.g. project 
characteristics and relationship characteristics) influencing exercise of control (Kirsch 1997; Rao et al. 
2007). Considering the wealth of knowledge from past studies, we do not intend to discuss the 
theoretical fit of the existing control theory modes and structures for ISD-outsourcing in this paper. 
Such discussions are available on choice of control mechanisms (Choudhury and Sabherwal 2003; 
Rustagi et al. 2008), project performance improvement through control mechanisms (Gopal and Gosain 
2010; Srivastava and Teo 2012b; Tiwana and Keil 2009), amount of control for ISD-outsourcing project 
success (Remus and Wiener 2012; Rustagi et al. 2008) and portfolio of controls in ISD-outsourcing 
projects (Choudhury and Sabherwal 2003). In a recent extension to control theory, Srivastava and Teo 
(2012b) introduced the concept of structural and process control mechanisms explicating the nuances 
of relationship governance between client and vendor in the ISD-outsourcing context. The structural 
control mechanism describes “what” operates control mode, whereas the process control mechanism 
explains “how” client-vendor relationship is regulated (see figure 1). Existing formal and informal 
controls were re-defined as structural control mechanisms. The formal control is a performance 
evaluation strategy, where either outcomes or behaviors are measured, evaluated and rewarded 
(Eisenhardt 1985). The formal control mode can be further subdivided into outcome-based and 
behavior-based modes (Kirsch 1996). The outcome-based mode includes formally specified expected 
outcomes (Eisenhardt 1985; Ouchi 1979), whereas the behavior-based mode includes formally specified 
appropriate behaviors (Eisenhardt 1985; Kirsch 1997). In ISD-outsourcing context, client and 
outsourcing partners utilize several documents to specify expected outcomes and behaviors. Those 
documents include business requirement specifications, project plans, project milestones and design 
documents (Choudhury and Sabherwal 2003). The informal control differs from formal control in that 
it is based on social or people strategies (Jaworski 1988). The informal control consists of clan and self-
control modes. According to Ouchi (1980), clan control includes common values and beliefs within a 
group of individuals, who share a set of common goals. On the other hand, self-control comprises of self-
imposed norms (Manz and Angle 1986). According to Kirsch (1997), organizations implement 
controlling mechanisms that typically includes a mix of formal and informal control modes. According 
to Srivastava and Teo (2012b), the process control mechanism includes three governance mechanisms: 
1) mechanistic governance, 2) relational governance, and 3) self-governance. Mechanistic governance in 
ISD-outsourcing, describes the coordination between the client and the vendor by strict adherence to a 
contract3. Relational governance focuses on the shared values, beliefs, rituals and the ongoing 
relationship between the client and the vendor, rather than following the contract very closely. Self-
governance occurs when there is little or no coordination between the client and the vendor as the task 
is self-monitored by the vendor.  
In general, organizations utilize different process control mechanism combinations according to the 
situation of their projects. Although the Control Theory literature discusses process control mechanisms 
individually, it does not describe different types of process control mechanism combinations. We term 
these combinations as control configurations. We argue that lack of understanding of control 
configurations could lead to ISD-outsourcing project failures. For example, even though contracts of 
some ISD-outsourcing projects are lack of contract specificity4, only mechanistic governance is used for 
project execution. Utilization of mechanistic governance for the projects with lack of contract specificity 
can lead to project failures. Therefore, ISD-outsourcing organizations should use control configurations 
appropriately to ensure the project success.   
                                                        
3 Contract specifies the expected outcomes and behaviors of the project. In ISD-outsourcing context, formal documents such as 
business requirement specifications, project plans, project milestones and design documents are considered as contracts 
between client and outsourcing partners.  
4 Contract specificity: the explicitness of details specified in the contract.  
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Figure 1. Structural and Process Control Mechanisms 
3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This study has a qualitative research design. The qualitative case study approach is recognized as 
appropriate for research that explores complex environments (Klein and Myers 1999) and contemporary 
events (Benbasat et al. 1987). The case organization was selected using the criterion sampling strategy 
(Patton 2002). First, the organization should be involved in multiple ISD projects to provide flexibility 
in data collection. Second, the organization must be sufficiently large, with a standard hierarchy of 
employment. This enables collecting data from team members at different levels of employment. 
Following the application of these criteria, Company A was selected as the case organization. Company 
A was a medium sized ISD company, engaging in stock market-related ISD. The company dealt with 
multiple exchanges, which had multiple asset classes such as equities, securities lending and borrowing5. 
The company specializes in developing IS solutions for capital markets, with more than 25 capital 
market clients all over the world. Those solutions provide the ability to trade using multiple assets and 
manage securities lending and borrowing. Fifteen (15) semi-structured interviews each lasting between 
20-30 minutes were conducted with the employees from eight (8) ISD-outsourcing projects of Company 
A. The sampling technique is non-probability, purposive and employed the ‘snowball technique’ 
(interview participants were appropriate opinion leaders of the research topic) (Minichiello et al. 1995). 
At the beginning of the interview, the participants were informed about the objective of the study. At the 
end, participants were asked to suggest other employees who are knowledgeable about the control 
mechanisms in projects. Participants were diverged as new employees were converged to the sample in 
the interview process, according to recommendations from previous participants (Patton 2002). All the 
interviews were recorded, with additional notes taken whenever necessary. The interview data was 
supplemented with the business requirement specifications and other internal documents such as 
quality assurance documents (test cases and test scenarios) and change request documents. Those 
documents increased the understanding of different types of control configurations in projects.   
Following the guidelines of Eisenhardt (1989), data analysis was performed in tandem with the data 
collection to take advantage of the flexibility that the case study affords. The emergent concepts in one 
interview were verified in the subsequent interview until the state of theoretical saturation was reached, 
which is the point where it is possible to comprehensively explain the findings of the case study 
(Eisenhardt 1989; Sedera et al. 2001). Theoretical saturation was identified when the incremental 
learning was minimal during the interviews. The structural and process control mechanisms formed the 
initial set of themes through which we analysed the interview data. In the early interviews, we recognized 
some emerging concepts about the control configurations. While some of the emerging concepts were 
verified by the case evidence, some were revised or disconfirmed. Replication logic were utilized, where 
the logic of treating each case study as an experiment with each case serving to confirm or disconfirm 
the findings (Eisenhardt 1989). Herein, the cases which confirm emergent relationships improve the 
                                                        
5 For a wider discussion of the above concepts see for example Senarath and Copp (2015), Senarath (2016) and Senarath (2017).  
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richness, depth and validity of the relationships (Patton 2002), whereas cases which disconfirm the 
relationships were used to refine and extend the theory.  
4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
In general, organizations execute different combinations of process control mechanisms (see Table 1). 
We have recognized that probability of executing some of the combinations are less likely than the 
others. We identified five types of control configurations in ISD-outsourcing projects; 1) singular 
configuration, 2) negotiated configuration, 3) self-managed configuration, 4) negotiated-clan 
configuration, and 5) self-disciplined configuration (see figure 2). Those configuration types were 
identified according to the level (high, medium and low) of each process control mechanism 
(mechanistic governance, relational governance and self-governance). When locus of control is with the 
particular process control mechanism, it is considered as ‘High’. ‘Medium’ is when a process control 
exists, but the locus of control is with another process control mechanism. ‘Low’ is when the process 
control mechanism does not exists / or very less compared to other process control mechanisms. We 
argue that better understanding of these configurations would increase the ISD-outsourcing project 
success. 
 
Figure 2: The current study’s contribution to control theory 
A “singular configuration” is where only one process control mechanism is highly prominent compared 
to other two process control mechanisms. We observed three combinative patters of singular 
configurations; 1) ‘high’ mechanistic governance with ‘low’ relational and ‘low’ self-governance (see row 
1 in table 1), 2) ‘high’ relational governance with ‘low’ mechanistic and ‘low’ self-governance (see row 4 
in table 1), and 3) ‘high’ self-governance with ‘low’ mechanistic and ‘low’ relational governance (see row 
7 in table 1). As ISD-outsourcing projects highly depend on contract, configurations should either have 
‘high’ or ‘medium’ level of mechanistic governance. It is unlikely to have ‘low’ mechanistic governance, 
where the ISD-outsourcing projects do not / rarely follow a contract. Therefore, from the three 
combinations mentioned above, while the first combination (‘high’ mechanistic governance with ‘low’ 
relational and ‘low’ self-governance (see row 1 in table 1) is likely to occur, other two are unlikely to take 
place in ISD-outsourcing projects.  First combinative pattern (‘high’ mechanistic governance with ‘low’ 
relational and ‘low’ self-governance (see row 1 in table 1) is when projects are governed strictly adherence 
to the pre-specified contract without / fewer amendments to contract based on vendor suggestions. 
Moreover, in this instance self-governance by the vendor is low. For example, client maintains detailed 
contracts and wants the vender to follow contract very closely. In those projects, the change request 
documents are utilized to manage the changes to the initial client requirements. Even after the project 
goes live, clients request additional functionalities (onwards and upwards) of the information system. 
These requests will also be managed through the change request documents.  
A “negotiated configuration” occurs with ‘high’ mechanistic governance, ‘medium’ relational governance 
and ‘low’ self-governance (see row 2 in table 1). Although client wanted vender to follow contracts very 
closely, vender was able to discuss with client and amend contracts during project execution. R1 
explained the negotiated configuration in terms of time estimations: “We agree upon certain time lines. 
But, if it is really unfair, either party can speak and get it extended”. Negotiated configuration is crucial 
for the success of an ISD-outsourcing project.  
“Self-managed configuration” is observed when mechanistic governance is ‘high’, relational governance 
is ‘low’ and self-governance is ‘medium’ (see row 3 in table 1). Since there is no/very less amendments 
to the contract based on vendor suggestions, vendor has to work extra hours to achieve the targets 
specified in the contract. Most of the respondents explained that they work extra hours to meet the  
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deadlines. According to R1; “We are working in a tight deadline; definitely we have to make some 
arrangements by working extra hours”.  
“Negotiated-clan” configuration was observed with ‘medium’ mechanistic governance, ‘high’ relational 
governance and ‘low’ self-governance (see row 5 in table 1). In this instance, project is highly governed 
by broad framework of shared values and beliefs, with medium adherence to pre-specified contract. For 
example, the client utilizes relational governance to manage day-to-day operations with quick decisions. 
Examples of this approach were reported in the interviews. Sometimes they experience a high 
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contract based on vendor suggestions  
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High Low Medium • Strict adherence to the contract 
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• Project is broadly governed by broad 
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• Project is broadly governed by shared 





Low High Medium • No/ very less strict adherence to the 
contract  
• Project is broadly governed by shared 
values and beliefs.  





Low Low High • No strict adherence to the contract  
• Project is not governed by shared values 
and beliefs.  






Medium Low High • Strict adherence to the contract  
• Project is not governed by shared values 
and beliefs. 





Low Medium High • No/ very less strict adherence to the 
contract  
• Project is governed by shared values and 
beliefs. 
• Task is self-monitored by the vendor 
Unlikely - 
10  Mechanistic 
Relational 
Self  
High High High • Strict adherence to the contract  
• Project is broadly governed by shared 
value and beliefs.  





11 - Low Low Low • No strict adherence to the contract  
• Project is not governed by shared values 
and beliefs. 




Table 1. Control Configurations 
“Self-disciplined configuration” is with ‘medium’ mechanistic governance, ‘low’ relational governance 
and ‘high’ self-governance (see row 8 in table 1). For example, client provides high level documents 
which include expected outcomes/ behaviors from vendors. Then, the client expects vendor to take the 
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responsibility of providing expected outcomes according to vendor’s own procedures. Moreover, we 
observed self-disciplined configuration in terms of internal releases6. R7 stated that they have internal 
releases before they send the documents to the client. As R7 explained, “We have lots of internal 
releases. Then only we provide those documents to the client side”. The self- disciplined configurations 
of the vendor company minimize the problems in ISD-outsourcing projects. 
Since all ISD-outsourcing projects highly depend on contract, it is unlikely to have a configuration with 
‘low’ mechanistic governance. Therefore, configurations with ‘low’ mechanistic governance, ‘high’ 
relational governance and ‘medium’ self-governance (row 6 table 1) or ‘low’ mechanistic governance, 
‘medium’ relational governance and ‘high’ self-governance, are unlikely to occur in ISD-outsourcing 
projects. Moreover, it is unlikely that all three configuration types are ‘high’ (row10 in table 1) or all are 
‘low’ (row 11 in table 1). We have defined level ‘high’ when the locus of control is with the particular 
process control mechanism and ‘low’ when a particular process control mechanism does not exists / or 
very less compared to other process control mechanisms. According to the definition, two process 
control mechanisms could not have ‘high’ simultaneously. Therefore, it is unlikely to operationalize a 
control configuration, which has ‘high’ in all three process control mechanisms. Moreover, ISD-
outsourcing projects should be governed by at least one process control mechanism. Therefore, it is 
impossible to have the level of all three process control mechanisms as ‘low’. 
Identifying the Relationship between Control Configurations and Project Success 
Having identified control configurations, we then explore the relationships between the control 
configurations and ISD-outsourcing project success. We summarized the comments provided by the 
respondents regarding different projects and derived the conclusions accordingly (see Table 2). “Status” 
was categorized into two groups: 1) ‘unsuccessful’, where the client discontinued or dissatisfied with 
most of the outcomes of the information system, or 2) ‘successful’, the client is satisfied with most of 
outcomes of the information system. We acknowledge that the level of configuration; ‘high’, ‘medium’ 
and ‘low’ is a relative indication. Data analysis revealed that ISD-outsourcing projects have different 
control configurations during the life cycle according to the requirements of the project, meaning that 
‘high’ level of one configuration at the beginning of the project does not ensure or lead to ‘high’, ‘medium’ 
or ‘low’ of another configuration during final stages of the project. As an example, P3 had a ‘high’ 
negotiated-clan configuration as well as ‘high’ singular configuration as per the requirements of the 
project in various life cycle stages. According to R14, in project P3 they had ‘high’ singular configuration: 
“Documents..., normally we always use it, when an issue comes or we need to clarify something, we 
always refer to documents”. R14 also explained that: “If we want something urgently, just straightway 
go to them and ask”. This indicated that P3 consisted of a ‘high’ singular configuration as well as a ‘high’ 
negotiated-clan configuration as per the requirements. Conclusions were derived by considering 
configuration types, which were employed in the project at least once during the project life cycle. 
The data analysis revealed that all the ISD-outsourcing projects had ‘high’ self-managed configuration. 
This indicated that, regardless of the controlling process, all the employees tended to work extra hours 
to achieve the targets. According to R1, “We are working in a tight deadline; definitely we have to make 
some arrangements by working extra hours”. According to the data analysis, all the ISD-outsourcing 
projects had ‘high’ self-disciplined configuration. This indicates although client provides high level 
documents and overall time estimations to venders, client expects the vender to follow their own 
procedures to provide the expected outcomes. According to R1; “We have shared them the efforts. We 
will be doing the effort estimations when they have given a task”. Moreover, the projects had standard 
processes like internal releases. According to R7, “We have lots of internal releases. Then only we 
provide those documents to the client side”. Therefore, self-managed configuration and self-disciplined 
configuration alone do not have an impact on ISD-outsourcing project success.  
While P1, P3 and P8 were successful with ‘high’ negotiated-clan configuration. Although P7 has ‘low’ 
negotiated-clan configuration, it was also successful. This indicates that negotiated-clan configuration 
alone does not have an impact on ISD-outsourcing project success. Project P3 was successful with ‘high’ 
singular configuration and ‘high’ negotiated configuration. While P1 was successful with ‘medium’ 
singular configuration and ‘high’ negotiated configuration, P7 and P8 were successful with ‘high’ 
singular configuration and ‘medium’ negotiated configuration. All the other projects (P2, P4, P5 and P6) 
were unsuccessful, as they had ‘medium’ / ‘low’ in singular and negotiated configurations. This indicates 
that from singular and negotiated configuration, least one should be ‘high’ to make ISD-outsourcing 
projects a success.  
                                                        
6 Internal releases consist of releasing information system for quality assurance before sending it to the vendor. 
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1 Medium [20]* High [8] High  High [14] High [21] Successful 
2 Medium Medium [9] High  High High  Unsuccessful 
3 High [1 / 19] High [6]  High High [12/18] High Successful [23] 
4 Low [3 /5] Medium [10] High Medium [16/17/26] High  Unsuccessful 
5 Medium [4] Medium High Low High Unsuccessful  
6 Low  Medium [11] High High High [22] Unsuccessful [24]  
7 High [2/15] Medium  High Low [15] High Successful 
8 High Medium [7] High  High [13] High  Successful 
* Refer appendix 1 for the sample quotations  
Table 2: control configurations and project success 
5 DISCUSSION 
The goal of the study was to explore the methods to improve ISD-outsourcing project success. Control 
Theory was selected as the theoretical lens, since it is widely used in ISD-outsourcing domain for 
explaining the controlling mechanisms for project success. Study results reported that lack of 
understanding of combinative patterns of process control mechanisms leads to ISD-outsourcing project 
failures. Five types of control configurations were introduced; 1) singular configuration, 2) negotiated 
configuration, 3) self-managed configuration, 4) negotiated-clan configuration and 5) self-disciplined 
configuration. Singular configuration can be observed when only one process control mechanism is 
highly prominent compared to other process control mechanisms. Negotiated configuration occurs 
when 1) the client wanted vender to follow contracts very closely and 2) vender was able to discuss with 
client and amend contracts during project execution. Self-managed configuration can be observed when 
there is no/very less amendments to the contract based on vendor suggestions. Therefore, vendor has 
to work extra hours to achieve the targets specified in the contract. While Negotiated-clan configuration 
is about client utilizing relational governance to manage day-to-day operations with quick decisions, 
self-disciplined configuration is when the client provides high level contract and expects vendor to take 
the responsibility of providing project outcomes according to vendor’s own procedures. 
The data analysis revealed: 1) different projects within the same company could have different control 
configurations, 2) control configurations have a bearing on the ISD-outsourcing project success, 3) self-
managed configuration, self-disciplined configuration and negotiated-clan configuration alone do not 
have an impact on ISD-outsourcing project success, 4) either singular or negotiated configuration 
should be ‘high’ to make ISD-outsourcing projects a success, and 5) projects employ various control 
configurations in different stages of information system development life cycle.  
6 IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
From the theoretical perspective, this research highlighted the inadequacy of the existing Control Theory 
to manage ISD-outsourcing projects. Accordingly, this research extends Control Theory and make it 
more applicable for contemporary ISD-outsourcing projects. Proving a theoretical extension to Control 
Theory, we introduced five types of control configurations in which different process control 
mechanisms combine; 1) singular configuration, 2) negotiated configuration, 3) self-managed 
configuration, 4) negotiated-clan configuration and 5) self-disciplined configuration. These control 
configurations provide better understanding of controlling mechanisms in contemporary ISD-
outsourcing projects. Moreover, data analysis revealed relationships between control configuration 
combinations and ISD-outsourcing project success. By describing the importance of different control 
configurations in different stages of ISD-outsourcing project lifecycle, our study highlights the need to 
monitor control configurations throughout project lifecycle.  
In addition to implications for research, our study has the potential to influence the practice of ISD-
outsourcing. According to the data analysis, ISD-outsourcing projects were not being able to gain the 
expected outcomes, due to lack of understanding of different types of combinative patterns of process 
control mechanisms. Proposed control configurations will provide a solution by improving the 
understanding of combinative patterns of different process control mechanisms. Furthermore, this 
research highlights the importance of selecting appropriate control configurations throughout project 
Australasian Conference on Information Systems                                                   Nuwangi, Sedera & Srivastava 
2019, Perth Western Australia  Conceptualizing Control Configurations 
  584 
lifecycle. More importantly, our study emphasizes the need to monitor control configurations 
throughout project lifecycle to minimize ISD-outsourcing project failures. 
There are limitations of the study which reduce its generalizability. First, our emphasis was on the effect 
of control configurations for the ISD-outsourcing project failures. There can be some other factors (i.e. 
client requirement volatility, inaccurate budget and time estimations), which cause for ISD-outsourcing 
project failures. Considering the other factors would provide more accurate theoretical extensions. 
Second, there can be more combinative patters of different process control mechanisms, which we 
haven’t considered. Future research could examine further about different combinative patters of 
process control mechanisms. Third, future studies would further explore various control configurations 
employed in projects based on the stage of the Information System development lifecycle.  By doing so, 
the researchers will be able to provide more insights into which configuration should be used in each 
stage of Information System development lifecycle.  
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Appendix 
R* P** P*** Sample Quotation 
1 P3 R14 Documents, normally we always use it, when an issue comes or we need to clarify something, we 
always refer to documents 
2 P7 R10 Fist we follow the exact documents. Very rarely have the discussions with them 
3  P4 R6 The most difficult thing is defect verifications. Defects which were raised by our client, because there 
are no proper guidelines.  
4 P5 R9 The basic problem that we are having is with the Business Requirement Specification. Business 
Requirement Specification is not detailed enough to grab all the knowledge 
5 P4 R6 They do not provide the exact steps to verify a defect. 
6  P3 R13 If we informed them that the particular estimated time is not enough for us, it will take long time, 
then we can tell them and increase it or decrease it.  
7 P8 R15 If there is any decision has been taken due to a phone call, we could always have an email to formalize 
what we discussed  
8 P1 R1 We agree upon certain timelines. But, if it is really unfair, either party can speak and get it extended 
9 P2 R2 Normally this is the process. If we have a phone call or whatever we drop a mail According to our 
discussion, we are doing like this. So, that is safe side for both the parties.  Then there will be a tracking 
10 P4 R6 We are advised by our senior people we are always trying to have a proof. Sometimes we are calling 
to our client and we get that clarification after the call we drop a mail “As we discussed you have been 
agreed to this, so we are doing this according to your clarification”. So, they are confirming that. 
11 P6 R8 We have to confirm all through email whatever the things they are telling through the calls. We have 
to send back a mail.  
12 P3 R14 If we want something urgently, just straightway go to them and ask 
13 P8 R15 It is a matter of phone call to say, “hey you know, this issue? What is the state”. 
14 P1 R1 We go through the phone calls.  We can call directly and get the details easily. 
15 P7 R10 First, we follow the documents. Very rarely we have discussions with them.  
16 P4 R6 They tell that has been changed and this will be updated in the next document. But until that we can’t 
hold the task.  
17 P4 R6 With the trust we do the task at that time before we get that updated document. Sometimes it happens. 
18 P3 R3 Reduction of mail sent throughout does not mean that reduction of communication. It is more 
like now the phone calls becoming more frequent which is more effective than emails 
19 P3 R13 Whenever a change happens, there will be a change request document.  
20  P1 R1 They don't bother to document every single bit of document.  
21 P1 R1 We have shared them the efforts. We will be doing the effort estimations when they have given a task 
22 P6 R7 We have lots of internal releases. Then only we provide those documents to the client side 
23  P3 R13 Our project is stable 
24 P6 R8 I think it is unstable 
*Reference ID, **Project ID, ***Participant ID  
Table 3: Sample Quotations 
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